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REPORT OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY
DENVER RESEARCH INSTITUTE • UNIVERS ITY OF DENVER
This is a report in a series prepared for the Office of Technology
Utilization, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). It
presents the results of research on technology transfer conducted by the
Industrial Economics Division of the University of Denver Research
Institute (DRI).
Material presented in this report was gathered and analyzed as a part
of the Project for the Analysis of Technology Transfer (PATT). PATT was
established in November 1967 to provide a better understanding of the
technology transfer process by examining nonspace applications of NASA-
developed technology. To achieve this goal PATT has the following
objectives:
1. To operate a Technology Transfer Data Bank.
2. To document actual and potential cases of transfer of space-
related technology to secondary uses.
3. To suggest for NASA's consideration programs or mechanisms to
improve the effectiveness and to reduce the costs of NASA's
technology transfer activities. This objective is partially met by the
accomplishment of specific research tasks dealing with various aspects
of the Technology Utilization Program.
4. To maintain contact with sources of technology, with channels of
technological communication, and with users of technology in order
to stay in touch with developments affecting performance of these
participants in the technology transfer process.
5. To maintain awareness of past and on-going research contribu-
tions to the understanding of the technology transfer process, and to
contribute to this knowledge base.
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INTRODUCTION
What is known about how to communicate and use information
on new technologies?
Does this experience suggest ways of achieving more effective and
beneficial uses of technology in the 1970's?
Can better technology transfer systems be designed, both to
encourage innovation in business and industry and to help solve pressing
"public sector" problems?
To explore these and related questions, the University of Denver
Research Institute (DRI) convened an informal conference in
Snowmass-at-Aspen, Colorado, in September 1969. It brought together
industry, government, universities and research organizations with special
interests in the methods, problems and effects of technology transfer. A
wide range of organizations and points of view was represented among the
35 invitees. Participants were either suppliers of technological
information, users of technology or observer-researchers of the technology
transfer process. Some of them, such as the participants from large
technology-based companies or government agencies, represented
organizations which are both generators and users of technology. The
agenda and a list of conference participants are at the end of this report.
The Aspen Conference involved two and a half days of in-session
discussion of technology transfer. After an introductory paper, the
remaining sessions were structured around different functional
interests — the source, the user, the researcher. Attention then was
concentrated on what the conferees generally agreed was the most
significant target for the technological transfusion — the urban scene.
Finally, a consensus was proposed, modified, and agreed to.
Participation was universal, there were no spectators among the
conferees. The conference was oriented toward contribution and
synthesis. Instead of reporting what had been found significant, the
conference sought to identify what would become significant. These
efforts are highlighted in the following pages.
OVERVIEW
Transfer, Diffusion, and Innovation
A basic framework for "technology transfer" was suggested at the
outset of the conference to provide a common basis for discussion: Tech-
nology transfers or moves when it is applied sonnewhere else than where it
is originated. A technology transfer program is a purposive, conscious
effort to move technical devices, materials, methods, and/or information
from the point of discovery or development to new users.
Often the technology to be transferred must be altered or
"repackaged" to fit the requirements or interests of the new user. This
may be done by the source, by the user, or by intermediaries "broker"
groups or organizations. A source may be a governmental or industrial
laboratory or another performer of research and development. Users
include business firms, other types of organizations, "public sector"
groups such as local government, even individuals. [This concept of
technology transfer thus differs from the more general processes of
technology diffusion or technological innovation: technology usually
diffuses or moves from sources to new users without a focused effort to
transfer it, and many innovations are never transferred to applications in 	 #
new settings.]	 I
Another take off point for the conference was a set of conven-
tional wisdoms about technology transfer, shared by most of the
participants. These included among others: While it is certainly possible
and often useful to deliberatel y transfer technolo gv. experience with
technology transfer programs in recent years has raised many new
questions and problems. Such programs are complex undertakings. Most
of the dramatic moves of technology occur without aid from formal
communication programs linking innovating sources to new users. There is
a wide variation between different sectors of the economy regarding
openness to innovation, some groups and organizations which might
benefit most are unaware of or unwilling to risk exploring possible sources
of help from technology. Then, too, there is the question of values and
goals: There is little agreement — indeed, little thought has been
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given — to what kinds of technology ought to be transferred and to
whom, if the public interest as well as profit and industrial growth are to
be considered.
The discussions of what should be done in the future largely
depended on this view of the present, as is seen in the remainder of the
report.
Suppliers vs. Users of Technology
Throughout the conference but particularly in its early stages, two
interests in technology transfer competed for attention. It was difficult to
talk about the technology transfer process as a whole because of a differ-
ence in orientation among the participants. Those who were suppliers or
sources of technological information tended to focus on the quality of
their information or transfer techniques. In contrast, representatives of
user or audience groups, both from industry and the public sector, showed
more concern with improving the environment within their organizations,
thus enhancing their chances of acquiring and using new technology. They
seemed relatively less concerned with the sources of potentially useful
information, or the inedia by which t i, ey might acquire it.
It was generally agreed that much more needs to be known about
all stages in the technology transfer process. In particular, though, more
aitc„tion needs to be given to the present and potential users of
technology: who they are or might be, what kinds of technology might
be most beneficial to them, and what needs to be done to encourage the
appropriate use of technology consistent with the public interest.
There seemed to be an underlying assumption at this conference
that action for really effective technology transfer should start with
potential users, rather than the sources. The potential user must be
identified, aroused, motivated, aware that a technological solution exists,
and willing to exert effort to adapt the potentially useful technology to
his needs. Much of this process may be rambling, even irrational. It may
involve browsing, rumination, or insights to parts of the problem provided
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by seemingly unrelated data or concepts. Thus in some ultimate sense it
may be said that technology transfer cannot be fully programmed.
Perhaps the most that can be done is to create conditions which will make
it more likely that new technology will be knowable and usable by those
who might apply it more widely or in new ways.
Here, many conferees seemed to be saying, is where suppli_^r and
"broker" organizations should exert their main efforts: attempting to
induce more awareness and interest once they have been defined and an
environment favorable to transfer has been created. Comments such as the
following conveyed this underlying assumption by many if not most of
the conferees:
KNOX: The hardware for technology transfer is pretty
much what we would like it to be. But what do we want to
use this for? What is technology transfer, and what can we
do to improve it?
MOFFETT: It's not enough to design a system that can be
used. A system has to be designed which will motivate
people to use it. This is itself a technical design problem.
All of these issues, the conference discussion made clear, are relevant to
the development and management of technology transfer in the 1970's.
Thus the conference deliberations moved back and forth between what
has been learned and what might be or ought to be done about technology
transfer in the decade ahead.
The major themes of the discussions are briefed at the end of this
report, in Conclusions from the Conference.
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WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED ABOUT
THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS?
KNOX opened the meeting by providing an overview of how
technology once generated and disseminated, moves. His summary was
purposely very general, defining technology to include both "hardware"
(devices or equipment) and "software" (methods, techniques, manage-
ment systems or other information). As the conference proceeded, the
sequence of steps described also seemed to apply to all kinds of sources
and users of technology.
First, some kind of alerting or awareness occurs. The potential
user discovers — or has it brought to his attention — that a technical
development may help solve a problem or offer him an opportunity.
Second, the arousal of interest which this initial awareness creates
leads to a search for further information.
Third, the new information is evaluated. What details are lacking?
What will have to be done to make the new (to the user) technology
applicable to his situation, and what will this adaptation cost? Is the
technology new enough or exclusive enough to represent a real advantage
to the user organization? These are examples of evaluative questions.
Fourth, if the evaluation results in a decision to go ahead, the new
device or technique is given a trial run after whatever modification may be
required.
Fifth. if the results of this step look good, an unplanned,
unprogrammed transfer of technology may be said to have occurred. The
technology has been put to work in a setting different from the one in
which it originated.
The process is rarely so straightforward. It may include many
delays, backtracking or detours. For example, step three is apt to include
struggles between various members of the user organization who hold
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different opinions of the value of the innovation heing considered,
volunteer alternative solutions, or reject the idea because of the "n.i.h."
("not invented here") factor.
Citing research by Edwin Mansfield of the University of
Pennsylvania, KNOX suggested that the likelihood of transfer occurring
depends prir;arily on three factors:
• the perceived long-term advantage or worth of the innovation to
the prospective user,
• the ease of accommodation of the innovation within the user's
program or organization; and
• the amount of risk involved in adapting and adopting the
innovation.
The Environment for Transfer
These factors, as later conference discussions made clear, are often
outside the user organization and may be beyond its control. They may be
even less amenable to action by someone purposely programming
technology transfer. Perceived advantage, ease of accommodation, and
risk often, depend oil environment surrounding the user organization.
For business firms, this environment includes the competition and present
or potential customers. In the public sector, laws determining local
government structure, public opinion and political considerations may be
the key elements which will affect adoption and use of technology,
though technically possible, transfer will not occur because the environ-
ment or motivation for action does not exist.
Many examples of Innovation, diffusion, and transfer mentioned
at the conference indicated the importance of "the right environment for
action" in bringing about the flow and use of technology. Various forces
affecting the motivation of both suppliers and users seem to have been
more important than the media or techniques employed. KNOX offered
this example:
Until 1920, the chemical industry used batch production
methods and depended oil
	 makers for the
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merely incremental improvements needed in an essentially
stable production technology. But the change to con-
tinuous production techniques created a need for wholly
new technologies which the equipment makers could not
supply. At this point independent engineering firms
became the innovators. They worked intensively with both
the chemical companies and equipment makers. In short,
new organizations emerged to meet a general need which
could not be met by the industry or its suppliers.
The importance of the "right environment for action" is even more
evident, KNOX maintained, for achieving technology transfer in non-
industrial sectors, such as education.
Ten thousand language laboratories were installed in
the U. S. between 1958 and 1962, but a number of
changes in the educational environment occurred
first: World War II experience with language training
which emphasized speaking rather than reading knowledge,
a policy statement by the U. S. Office of Education in
1952 drawing attention to the national need for more
capability in foreign languages; abandonment [ in 19561 of
a long-standing position by the Modern Language Associa-
tion in favor of foreign language training reading knowl-
edge; improvement of the basic technology (e.g., magnetic
tape and programmed instruction); and, finally, sufficient
money, through the National Defense Education Act, to
finance the required hardware and curriculum
development.
In short, many forces both in and outside education had to be present
simultaneously before large-scale diffusion and adoption of the language
lab technology (both hardware and software) became possible.
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WHAT HAS BEEN, AND OUGHT TO BE, TRANSFERRED?
One way of determining the main focus of technology transfer
thought in recent years is to analyze the literature in the field, summa-
rized in a bibliography available from DRI. MAHONEY did this, and
reported his findings to the conference. He classified all items in the
bibliography with respect to type of content, intended audience or area
for application, and the focus or objective of the discussion.
This analysis disclosed that the largest bulk of technology transfer
literature is of the "stinfo" (stinfo means scientific and technical infor-
mation) type, has been directed primarily to industry and is most
generally devoted to presenting technology as a resource for solving
industrial problems. CorrespondinF 1 1 1 , little appears in the literature on the
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'softer" kinds of technology (such as management techniques), and little
attention has been given as yet to the public sector as an audience.
These emphases are not surprising, but they do indicate that
current methods and content of technology transfer programs will have to
be significantly augmented and shifted to communicate new types of
technology and to serve new kinds of users of technology in the decade
ahead. As CARLSON commented,
Most government technology transfer programs started as
"stinfo" programs and are now trying to find ways to be
more than that.
SHOUP underlined the need for shift in emphasis:
All of us here come from the "stinfo" tradition. But if you
look at HUD and OEO, both of which — or their
successors — I think are going to be crucial transfer
agencies in the 1970's, the most important kind of
knowledge they have to transfer is grantsmanship. In other
words, to make known the management techniques, and
the combination of political and manipulative techniques,
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which are needed to get at the kinds of resources [ money
that these agencies control. This is hardly in the "stinfo"
tradition, but it's going to be very important in the 1970's.
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THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS
SOURCE AND SUPPLIER OF TECHNOLOGY
NASA's programs for dissemination of information on new
technology and promotion of technology transfer Have been the most
ambitious and intensive of any government agency. The National
Aeronautics and Space Act, which created the agency, required NASA to
"make the widest practical and appropriate dissemination of infor-
mation ..." resulting from agency programs. To carry out this require-
ment over the past decade, NASA's Technology Utilization Division has
originated or coordinated such activities as the following:
• Some 90,000 research reports on innovations by NASA labora-
tories and contractors.
• Tech Briefs: some 3000 brief reports of technical innovations
with special potential for nonaerospace applications, with backup
information available.
• Special publications dealing with specific areas of technology, such
as "state-of-the-art" reviews.
• Conferences, symposia and other meetings on a variety of
technologies or various aspects of the technology transfer process.
• Interchange of people between NASA labs and industry,
promoting the cross-fertilization of skills and experience.
In summarizing these activities PHILIPS pointed out that the
NASA program involves a variety of other methods and media. These
include: regional dissemination centers with industrial firms as sub-
scribers, joint sponsorship of activities with industrial and professional
groups, and, more recently, the use of "applications teams" to search the
pool of available technological information and adapt or modify new
technologies where possible to solve specific problems or reach new user
audiences. Examples of these new areas include: biomedical applications,
air pollution, law enforcement, and weather modification.
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PHILIPS described the NASA program as both practical and
evolving:
We like to think that we practice the art of the possible.
That is, we don't spend a lot of time theorizing and dealing
with abstractions.
We're building up a data base and some hypotheses about
the [technology transfer] process for our own program
and for sister programs such as the AEC and DOD, and for
academic people seriously interested in the subject.
Looking ahead to the 1970's, PHILIPS saw these kinds of
activities as desirable and likely in NASA's technology utilization
program:
• Defining the requirements for new technology implied by program
goals of NASA and other agencies. The idea here would be to
anticipate potentials for technology transfer as early as possible,
with the hope of stimulating interest among potential users and
speeding the dissemination process.
• Expanding the audience of potential users in various ways, both
by enlarging present user groups such as industrial firms and by
"rifling" information to particular professional or other groups
through their publications, via special meetings or in other ways.
• Stimulating fuller reporting of innovations by NASA laboratories
and NASA contractors (through more vigorous use of contractual
agreements that require NASA contractors to report new innova-
tions generated by their work for NASA).
• Extending the applications team concept, particularly to public
sector problems. NASA may be of help in getting better definition
of these problems, then in helping to determine the extent to
which new technology may be able to contribute solutions.
• Increased cooperation with such institutions as the United Nations
and the Organization of American States for increased use of new
technology to meet the needs of developing countries.
Other government-based technology transfer programs represented
at the conference have been designed to serve somewhat different
audiences, but apparently are being influenced by the NASA experience.
The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, has had a document-based
program targeted primarily to business firms already involved in nuclear
technology. GRATTON, discussing the AEC program, indicated that the
AEC audience for technology transfer should be more broadly
defined — to include other types of industry and perhaps public groups as
well — and that some of the NASA experience should be used in revital-
izing the AEC's program:
For the future, we've got to have something more than
paper; we've got to be able to prove that a transfer took
place. We're going to start a study to determine what
transfer system is best for us. We're also going to try to get
a program similar to NASA's applications teams.
In the Air Force, according to WOOSTER, technology transfer concern
has been directed toward justifying the relevance of the basic research
program of the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (in which the
technology transfer program is located) to the main mission of the Air
Force. Thus emphasis is placed on trying to communicate innovations to
university research programs and to industry, with the ultimate objective
of achieving technology transfer to Air Force research laboratories and
engineering groups. "Since an n.i.h. factor operates in the labs,"
WOOSTER explained, "adoptions [of new ideas] in the Air Force can be
increased if you get industry to submit the ideas [ rather than AFOSR ] ."
It is now Air Force and Department of Defense policy to
encourage the commercial publication of government research reports.
This represents a new communications medium for technological informa-
tion and may help to stimulate more awareness and interest than has been
achieved with other types of reporting services. WOOSTER added that the
same principle might be extended to other types of technological data and
other communications media:
Maybe the way to really get things done would be to grant
exclusive franchises, patent licenses and the like. But the
12
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moment you do that everyone else is going to scream and
holler at you... On the other hand, how else are you going
to get transfer? As it is now, it seems that everybody's
business is nobody's business. There is no particular
attraction to industry to pick u:, , a patent in the public
domain and spend their own funds exploiting it.
At the conference, there was some criticism of the federal
government-based technology transfer programs for having promised more
than can be delivered. These programs seem to have been fighting a
continual battle to stay alive within their parent agencies. MAHONEY, for
one, deplored this and suggested a remedy:
The government people here seem to have a somewhat
defensive approach, one of having to justify the programs
they're involved in. We need a firmer commitment to
technology transfer on the part of the federal government
in the upper echelons. If we had a firm commitment from
Congress and the White House that technology transfer is
desirable and that all federal agencies have a responsibility
to advance this, we might see more attention to the
problem.
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TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN INDUSTRY
Business and industry have been the main target for most formal
technology transfer programs and for media such as technical trade
publications, associations of research professionals, and data repositories.
The industrial community includes many thousands of organizations and,
Of course, many different degrees of receptivity to innovation and new
technology.
Large firms are not necessarily more innovative than smaller
companies. Though they may have more resources to invest in acquiring,
developing and testing innovation possibilities, large size and organiza-
tional complexity may increase the n.i.h. factor, and other barriers to
transfer. BIEBER, for example, felt that transferring ideas and innovations
from one group to another within a big company is often more difficult
than acquiring information from outside.
Transformation Required for Transfer
The main advantage for the larger firm may be that it can afford
to invest in the continuing process of transforming and adapting tech-
nology or innovative ideas, one of the key steps described by KNOX.
Technology can rarely be transferred "raw", LOEBNER noted:
Information which can be found is not in a situation to be
transferred. First it must be transformed. Most informa-
tion you get is either incomplete or wrong or unreliable. In
order to transfer it in you have to transform it by building
reliability in. The smaller firm may not be able to adapt
new technology to fit its own needs, or may not be aware
of the need to innovate, using "outside" technology, to
assure its own survival.
People as the Transfer Medium
To LOEBNER, information of the type provided in the
government-based technology transfer programs is of less value than other
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sources which, he said, give companies such as Hewlett-Packard,
concerned with complex, fast-changing technologies, a competitive
advantage they can maintain by getting new information in as early and as
complete a form as possible:
The first way to transfer technology is to hire the people
away from those who have the technology. If you can't do
that, then you try to get the information. In order to get
information from the right people, you can only buy
information, not for money, but with other information.
It's a barter system. If I in the laboratory want to know
something from Bell Labs, I have great success if I have
something to tell them they don't know. People don't talk
very loudly about this, but it's going on all the time. Only
if you don't know the people or you can't hire them away
do you go to the merchandiser of information.... But
there is little advantage to a company to receive the same
package and the same goods that another company has.
MAHONEY cited experience in the USSR which tends to confirm
the importance of effecting technology transfer by transferring people
rather than printed information or hardware. The Soviets about ten years
ago wanted to push development and application of cybernetics in
research and industry. They started with a system emphasizing distribu-
tion of published materials and other types of scientific and technical
information [ "stinfo"] . But then, a more people-centered method was
developed. Over a five-year period a number of technical people were
"immersed" in cybernetics and then assigned to new sectors or organiza-
tions where the impact was desired.
If people, as well as print, are to be important media purposively
communicating technology, then better information will be needed about
wbat kinds of people are most adept at both understanding various types
of technological problems in user organizations and obtaining the advice,
1
15
information or innovations which may contribute to a solution. As
MULLIS put it,
We need better skills inventories, coding of people to
match them against technological problems, once we've
identified the problem.
An approach to this problem-centered, people-centered approach
to technology transfer has been made by the information analysis centers
at Battelle Memorial Institute. These are technology information and
applied research groups Which specialize in pecific problem areas (not
technical specialties) and provide responses to questions from client firms.
Their aim is to solve technical problems, not ; p rovide bibliographies of
relevant research or undertake conventional studies. MURDOCK indicated
tL the major challenges in this program are to discover how to select
people with the right instincts, how to organize them for group effort, and
how to motivate them within a large research institute where most
professional colleagues have interests according to scientific or technical
fields, rather than problems.
Structuring for Innovation
Most large industrial organizations have tried to increase innova-
tiveness by a variety of structural changes. McGraw-Hill, KNOX
mentioned, has 192 profit centers, in which leadership is encouraged to
see opportunities for exploiting new technology and methods and involve
others in the development without relying heavily on a central corporate
staff. MULLIS described a similar effort at Owens-Illinois: locating
research and development activities in line divisions as well as the
corporate level.
In at least one large company, Esso Research and Engineering, the
importance of acquiring, adapting, and communicating scientific and
technical information has been shown by a change in accounting
procedure. Information processing is now treated as a direct or project
cost, instead of as overhead. Information specialists now work within
project groups, rather than in a central information center. BIEBER said
that this may lead to some loss of efficiency, but it seemed to show that
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information specialists have acquired more acceptance and status within
the firm:
Scientists are becoming aware that the information
business is specialized and requires techniques that they as
scientists don't have, both in acquiring information and in
getting it into a form that the scientist can use.
BIEBER went on to say that he had been impressed with the
greater willingness within his organization to admit that there are human
and emotional problems in transferring anJ using technology. This greater
freedom has led to efforts to improve the environment by a variety of
methods.
There's more open discussion of the human problems in
technology transfer, all the impedances and the n.i.h.
factors and the politics and what have you that go into the
daisy chain of innovation.
In the last two or three years we have made a big effort on
motivation and conAlmunication, using T-Groups and other
techniques, to promote freer and more open discussion of
barriers and hangups. Stress and fear work sometimes in
getting someone to move, but persuasion is usually better.
The openness with which these things can be discussed
now is really a marked change over five or ten years ago. I
see improvement in the rate of movement of ideas.
Also we have become less structured in the way we do
things. We have more routes to get to the same end. We're
trying to take each case (of technology transfer or inno-
vationj on an individual basis, looking at the politics, the
timing, the people involved. People can move along with
the innovation, if they want to go with it, into testing,
production and marketing. Also, there is less reliance on
reports.
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Research Needs in Technology Transfer
There has been a recent effort to develop a more detailed
understanding of what ha f)pens to the technology corllnl Lill ication process
within the firm itself. Massachusetts institute of Technology,
Northwestern University and other academic research groups have been
studying the social and psychological factors within the firm which tend
to enhance Or inhibit the Coln III Lill ication of innovative ideas and technical
information generally.
MIT, for example, looked at 200 industrial firms and their
consumption patterns so far as technical information was concerned.
ALLEN, reporting oil research, noted that the potential user firm
faces several problems in bringing about beneficial transfers. For any
single company, rvlost of what it needs to know is outside the organization
itself. Therefore it must constantly import information. But the firm must
also take steps to make sure that the information, once acquired, reaches
the correct persons Or groups within the organization. ALLEN added that
lie thinks the same situation in principhl- applies to any aggregate — a
"public sector" organization, a research institute, even a developing
country. He also commented that illost Of the remarks from user repre-
sentatives at the conference had identified an internal organizational
problem of one kind or another; this seemed to be true of both public and
private sector institutions.
The MIT study found that the average 1)erson in a company does
not use written material to keep in touch with innovations and tech-
nologies of possible interest: he relies much more heavily on person-to-
person contacts with colleagues within the firm. Some of these associates
are unusually active as collectors and disseminators of technical infor-
mation: they can be described as gatekeepers or mediators. They absorb
literature and also rely oil contacts outside the firm. The MIT
research also shows that the gatekeepers communicate heavily with each
other.
These findings raise a llunlber of interesting further problems. For
example. it is difficult to discover and describe the gatekeeper network
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directly; these relationships are very sensitive. As BIEBF R. noted,
gatekeeper types often spend much less time on "their real jobs" than
management thinks they do, even though they are apt to be good
producers too. But there is no doubting the importance of learning the
communication patterns within the firm for determining the ultimate
effectiveness of technology transfer. The researchers at the conference feel
that the surface of this field of study has barely been scratched.
ALLEN felt that better understanding of this process would be
obtained before technology transfer in either the private or the public
sector could be much improved:
We've been attempting to bring information into organiza-
tions, and I think we've been encountering a lot of diffi-
culty. We may have gone about as far as we can without
properly understanding what it is that's going on.
BARTH suggested two kinds of studies which would contribute
some of the needed knowledge. These are either starting or will be started
at Northwestern. One investigation focuses on information flow and
innovation in various units within thirteen different firms, giving
"snapshots" or vignettes of differences in the various groups concerned
with the transfer/innovation process: basic research, development
engineering, pilot prouuction, marketing. Another study, to be started
soon, will follow a single innovation or piece of technology through all
stages of acquisition, adaptation and development.
Not much seems to be known about the real costs of acquiring and
processing technical information. WELLES and GILMORE particularly
stressed this area as one which needs more attention if the technology
transfer process in industry is to be better understood and managed.
WELLES: The cost of acquiring information from outside
the firm is sizeable, even on a per engineer basis, if you
take into consideration reading time, conversational time,
conference time and so forth. This is a significant cost item
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that corporations might try to optimize. Right now it's
sort of going along.
GILMORE: There doesn't seem to be much knowledge of
the actual costs of surveying, acquiring, adapting, and
using outside technology, both in industry and in the
public sector. What are the comparative costs of acquisi-
tion? This is a make-or-buy decisiort, but today it's made
on a much less sophisticated basis than when you're in a
make-or-buy situation in hardware development.
MYERS thought it important to avoid giving all research attention
to innovations which have been transferred and utilized:
It's important to study the innovations that have failed or
that have been delayed for long periods of time. That's
really the only way you come to understand what the
barriers and blocks are. And you may find that a lot of the
innovations that looked very hot and later were hung up or
disappeared were really irrelevant innovations.
A further shift of research attention to present and potential users
of technology seemed to be required not only for the private sector but
for public institutions as well. SPENCER summed up what seemed to be a
general view at the conference:
Our conference has confirmed what a lot of us have
suspected, that something more is necessary for tech-
nology transfer to be effective. That something more is the
personal element, communication between people. And to
understand technology transfer better, we must shift our
base to the demand side, the users. This should be the
rc.,earch strategy for the 1970's.
How Satisfactory is Technology Transfer in Industry?
While everyone seemed to agree that much more needs to be
known about what happens concerning technology transfer, many of the
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industrial representatives present seemed to feel that technology transfer
services to industry are about as good as can be expected. and that a
further major effort is not required. Establishing and developing tech-
nology information services to industry may have been the major
accomplishment of the decade just ending. MERCURE was one of those
expressing such views:
Right now we probably have all the whistles and bells of
technology transfer that industry can use. if all the people
who are dreaming up new abstracting services, new
computing services and so forth were to stop today,
industry wouldn't even flinch.
However, others, such as KNOX, believed that this situation was
usual only for large firms with substantial in-house capabilities. They felt
that many segments of industry had not been reached, that this consti-
tutes a national problem, and that 'much more should be done about
technology transfer to the private sector:
Large segments of our industry are in a state of obsoles-
cence. National economic policy stresses the desirability of
having small firms, and individual entrepreneurs. These
small firms are not nearly so tied in the technology
transfer chain as the big firms are. We might lose sight of
the hundreds of thousands of firms where technology
transfer could be much more effective: than it is today.
KNOX had this concrete suggestion for action:
Federal loans might be made available to small firms, at
the same rates as exist for disaster relief, for definite
investments in new technology. They are almost in a
disaster situation.
"I
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The conference discussion	 showed	 consensus that	 the
	
right
environment for action in technology transfer does not yet exist with
respect to the public sector. Circumstances favoring awareness, arousal of
interest,	 acquisition	 of information,	 the acceptance of risk and final
adoption are unfavorable or Inissing with respect to most types of public
organizations that	 could make use of technology and which need to
innovate.
In crime prevention, there is no way for law enforcement agencies
to assess potentially useful technology which takes into account both
costs and application in existing law enforcement organizations. There are
not enough funds (under present systems of allocating public money) to
permit the experimental trial and demonstration programs needed.
In construction, an industry with a close interface with the public
sector, little attention is devoted to discovering or trying new tech-
r_ologies. Lack of capital, building codes and labor restrictions are often
cited as barriers to innovation.
In education, despite strenuous efforts by the U. S. Office of
Education and others in recent years, no alerting/awareness network yet
exists which school systems are motivated to use. Means of measuring
effectiveness of given innovations are mostly nonexistent. Thus despite a
tripling of federal funds for education in five years, little additional in-
novation has resulted.
In health care, the rate of innovation is much higher, but uneven.
Many areas of medicine have not made intensive efforts to use technology
to improve the quality of service. Although there is support for innovation
because of public awareness of health needs, the crucial step of experi-
ment is generally beyond tre reach of the individual practitioner. Hence
innovation tends to be concentrated in large medical complexes such as
teaching hospitals, this trend has been accelerated by the investment of
public funds for health care and medical research primarily in these same
large centers.
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Although technology transfer in the 1970's is going to involve
much greater concern with the public sector, according to the hopes and
beliefs of most conferees, prior experience with formal programs of
technology transfer may not give particularly useful guidance about how
to proceed. As BILLICK, among others, noted, conditions affecting the
possibility for technology transfers to the public sector are different from
those existing in industry, certainly more complex, and as yet not well
understood:
[In technology transfer programs] we have gone from the
agricultural field to the manufacturing field, and now we
are getting into the public sector. Perhaps the best studied
is the agricultural field. We are moving out of the manu-
facturing field without fully understanding the process,
and getting into the public sector. As we go through these
three fields, there's a big increase in the complexity of the
products and the organizational complexities become
greater and greater ... I don't think we understand the
decision-making process in the cities well enough to fully
exploit technology.
For one thing, we need the counterpart of the cost-profit
statement [ in industry]. There has been discussion of
social costs, but you rarely hear discussion of social profit.
KNOX suggested that building an informed public opinion to
create more motivation to use technology for meeting public sector needs
will be a difficult and complex problem. He contrasted other recent
examples of public demand and pressure with the kinds of problems
which need to be faced in the 1970's.
In areas like air and water pollution, cigarette smoking and
auto safety, tremendous public pressure built up for
change and innovation. The mass media developed
tremendous public support for technology utilization
without anybody having very good measures of efficiency
'3
improvement. People have now just accepted the fact that
these are desirable things to do.
The areas of crime, fire prevention, education and housing
won't be nearly as easy as these specifics. In the other
cases, the general public was attacking specific industries.
Now we are going to have to arouse the general public to
put pressure on a rather soft, nebulous public body, which
is not making a profit and therefore can't be accused of
greedy, manipulative behavior.
Here again, in KNOX's opinion, it would be of some help to get high-level
endorsement for greater attention to technology transfer possibilities:
I would like to see government agencies specifically
encouraged to work with the communications media to
develop continuing programs which would generate
customer demand for technology utilization in the public
sector. I think the Information Industries Association
would be quite willing to work with government agencies
to do something along this line .. .
And, I would like to see the presidential staff strengthened
in the technology area. All science and technology
problems are now funnelled to the Office of Science and
Technology, which is a 16-man office. It's the right place
for pressure to be brought on government agencies to get
more innovative-minded. It does wondrous things for
someone from that office to pay a visit to a federal agency
and ask for a stewardship review.
V LAANDEREN emphasized the importance of the mutual
awareness of a need for help, and technology as a source of help, before
technology transfer in the public sector is likely to occur. Transfer
possibilities are more likely to develop if there is a personal relationship
between the source or broker of innovations and the potential user,
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printed media or general dissemination of information will not cause
transfers to happen. He was speaking of the relationship between state
departments of education and local school districts, but much the same
point was made by others with respect to other parts of the public sector.
VLAANDEREN: The local district, the user, has to have a
need or a problem which we might help to solve, they have
to know they have a problem; we, as the potential supplier
or intermediary, have to know they have a problem, and
they have to know that we know that they have a
problem.
Although there are certainly differences between the public and private
sectors, he added, "we have to remember that both are run by human
beings. We have n.i.h. factors in education too."
MOFFETT, discussing the potential of technology transfer to
developing nations, emphasized that "soft" technologies are the main area
needing attention, and that special characteristics of the users must be
taken into account. Such needs as increased food production, rural
development, using urbanization as a vehicle for national development,
making education relevant to national needs, and population control — all
these, he noted, are areas for effort which require close attention to
attitudes, motivation and cultural backgrounds of the potential users or
targets for development effort.
There seemed to be close parallels here to many of the conditions
existing in the public sector within the United States. In both settings —
the public sector within the U. S. and overseas — MOFFETT said, "It's a
matter of fixing objectives, and then working back to decide what kind of
technology is best applied to achieve the objective that you've fixed."
The Cities
To focus the discussion of problems and opportunities for tech-
nology transfer in the public sector, the conference directed special
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attention to the urban scene. As in the discussions of the private sector,
some attempt was made to describe the current situation as a prelude to
considering what might be done to increase the use of applicable tech-
nology to help solve current urban problems.
A good deal of time was also spent comparing the situation in the
public sector, particularly local government, with conditions in industry
with respect to factors affecting technology transfer. Some motivations to
search out and use available technology which exist in indUst y' are not
now present in local government. These include the profit motive,
competition, and a capability for research and development.
Various characteristics of local urban government, the discussion
showed, cause cities to resist making use of new technology to improve
the quality of Conullunity services and cope more effectively with
comnlunity problems. One of these is the fact that urban government has
two layers: elected leadership which is usually short-terns, and a salaried
bureaucracy in which there is little incentive to change the system.
GARDINER: City [elected I officials have very short-term
lives, and usually have no special training in the municipal
field. They are elected by accident or for some vague
heroism in the past, and often are not competent to
control all of the things which are supposedly going on
underneath them. You choose a corporate manager
because he does something well related to what you do.
Mayors are chosen on different kinds of values ... The
power is at the bottom of the structure.
MYERS: I think the real problem in the cities is that the
bureaucracies, especially the larger ones, are really frozen
stiff and unable to deliver what they have to deliver. They
certainly are unable to respond in any innovative
way ... In the private sector, somewhere along the line the
whole institution has to respond to the market mechanism.
That pressure is always on somewhere, and finally reaches
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down to the lowest level bureaucrat at some time. In
government, that isn't the case. The question really before
the house is how to make it the case.
JOHNSON added:
Little technology transfer is possible today into local
government. About all we can have now is the salesman-
buyer concept. The buyer is always in an awkward
position because the seller is more informed.
FEILD had a ready answer for this:
Technology will be more rapidly utilized by local govern-
ment to the extent that outside pressures are brought to
bear on it, to the extent that some innovative people can
sell it politically, to the extent that some technicians can
figure out better ways to do things. That's not very dif-
ferent [from the private sector] .
Innovation — at least a search for new solutions — does seem to
occur in local government when, as FEILD put it, "there is a rise in the
level of dissatisfaction on the part of the electorate with the quality of
service that's being rendered." An example of this, mentioned by
BESUDEN and BILLICK, was the effort of several cities to collaborate on
reducing aircraft noise. Another is the current pressure for greater
effectiveness in dealing with crime and public safety. But when the
motivation comes from intense public dissatisfaction, the response by
local government is likely to be on a crisis basis, improvised and based on
inadequate information. As FEILD noted, "The problem is how to get
these needs met before the lid blows off — mobilizing the brain power,
getting the people who can provide the better technical solution, and so
forth."
A second characteristic of local government that inhibits effective
technology transfer is the nature of the problems with which city officials
have to deal most of the time.
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BESUDEN: Local government, probably more than any
other layer of government, has the job of delivery of
services. Garbage is collected today as it was 20 years ago.
Mayors and city managers understand these problems
much better than they understand the complex social and
economic problems of their urban areas.
FEILD: In local government, policy problems come in the
form of the overall economic or environmental strategy
that the city government is supposedly charged with, often
to avoid some otherwise N­pry bad situation, such as the
loss of tax revenue and employment because industry is
going to move away.
The nature of concerns in urban government was shown by the kinds of
needs for new technology which local officials identified in a recent
survey conducted by BESUDEN's organization. These were all related to
public services, and they were less concerned with hardware than with
"soft" technology such as management and planning techniques.
Operation Breakthrough: A Strategic Opportunity
A good deal of attention was given by the conference to Operation
Breakthrough, the large scale effort sponsored by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to generate and introduce substantial
innovations in urban housing. SeWial conferees urged that a thorough
study be made of Breakthrough beginning immediately; whether it
succeeds or fails, it will contain valuable lessons for improving the tech-
nology, innovation, diffusion, and transfer process.
It also combines a number of elements which the conference had
identified as crucial to further progress in technology transfer in the
1970's: a major social problem and need to be met, substantial require-
ments for both hard and soft technology, and involvement of a variety of
public and private organizations. MERCURE was one of those maintaining
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that Breaktlirougll should be studied because it will provide a way of
gaining knowledge about many aspects of technology transfer in the
public sector:
We need to have a good study of the history of the
program from now until something comes out the other
end and is pumped into the city. Breakthrough won't be a
success until someone deals with the crunchy problems
such as where are you going to put the buildings in the
community, what about the unions, and so forth.
The problem is not in developing or adapting the tech-
nology, but in creating an environment in which the
motivation is present to make technology transfer happen.
PRICE: Does the knowledge exist somewhere, right now,
to get the environment into this ready statF?
MERCURE: Don't ask me. I'm a pessimist in this matter.
M YERS: There were 561 responses (of bidders) to
Operation Breakthrough, which means 561 guys think
they've got an idea.
MERCURE: But maybe 561 guys are going to be
disappointed, because after HUD goes through this whole
exercise they're going to take it to Chicago or New York,
and suppose the people say no.
MYERS: I disagree with you. Up until now there hasn't
been an innovation in housing big enough to make a lot of
difference — so big that the unions and everyone else
would say, "we'll take it."
As this exchange indicates, Operation Breakthrough does serve to
focus attention oil 	 of the problems and issues discussed at the
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Ashen meeting, and dramatizes the huhlic sector eninhasis in technology
transfer which the conferees seemed convinced will be a major theme in
the next decade. BILLICK also stressed the importance of Breakthrough
as a point of entry into public sector needs and problems:
Operation Breakthrough is a big experiment in technology
transfer, where there will be no idea about what the
technology is going to be until the experiment is well
under way ... But the process is not being observed
closely enough ... When it's all through we may not be
any better off in terms of understanding what we have
done, why we were successful, and the implications.
Breakthrough, because it involves the total urban environt,Ient, raises
general issues about technology transfer to the public sector which have
not yet been fully considered: BILLICK went oil
	 say:
One of our big prob':-ms is to find out where technology
really is applicable and where it is not. Hardware-oriented
public services are perhaps the place where everyone will
think of technology as being most useful. But we have to
define technology in a very broad sense, not only as
hardware, and think what are the directions in which the
technology of the city should go.
FEILD: If you're going to demonstrate or experiment, go
where you have a chance for success, concentrate your
responses. The Model Cities program, for example, is a
disaster the minute you start spreading effort over so many
communities before you know what you're doing. The
Feds make an understandable mistake when they put their
dollars into areas of high need rather than where they can
show success. Of course they're always under very strong
political pressures.
BILLICK agreed: I don't think we understand the
decision-making process in the cities well enough, at least
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so far as technology is concerned, to fully exploit tech-
nology . . . And in conducting urban research and
demonstrations, we need to know more about how to pick
the cities where we will have the greatest visibility and the
greatest chance for success.
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NEW AUDIENCES, NEW INSTITUTIONS
It became clear that the broadening of the definition of tech-
nology also requires a broadening and redefinition of user groups. If
technology includes educational programs, planning methods. manage-
ment systems and similar "soft" items, many people in addition to
scientists, engineers and "hardware" specialists would become logical
targets for dissemination efforts. Furthermore, in earlier discussion of the
cities as one area of public sector problems, a key need seems to be to
create more awareness of and support for innovation possibilities among
the general public, as well as find ways to make this public concern
evident to local officials.
GILMORE: Maybe we should anticipate a new universe of
users of technological information in the next decade.
Interested citizens, the general public, whether for concern
for the community or for personal profit, are apt to
become more vocal and more important in the coming
decade [ as an audience]. This may come about in part
because of more income, more time to reflect, and a
shorter tolerable time span for the gratification of needs.
If the audiences and the content of technology transfer efforts are
to change, the desirability of creating new programs and media for
technology transfer also must be considered. With regard to the cities,
some conferees thought that major new technology transfer institutions
should be created to draw attention to the importance of the problem,
and provide a focus for Such activities as aggregating markets for urban
technology, undertaking national-level studies, and the like. But the
majority at the conference urged caution in this regard. Two of the more
characteristic comments were made by PHILIPS and SHOUP:
PHILIPS: I believe there's ample precedent in our society
to discourage the development of vast new institutional
capabilities in response to short-term problems ... t think
you've got to force the urbanologist, the decision-maker in
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the cities now, to become enough attuned, broad gauge
enough, to add to his own capabilities so he can under-
stand the new technologies and make the critical pre-
liminary decisions for the adaptation of these new
technologies to his own problem. I think we're missing the
heart of the problem if we continually seek to build new
institutional capabilities. We've got to put the burden on
the people responsible for meeting the requirements now,
today.
SHOUP: I think we all get kind of trapped in the cliche of
creating new institutions. I think the major untapped
resource for technology transfer in this country is the host
of wholesale institutions that already exist, for example,
for public sector problems, the public interest groups in
Washington. Until we take a hard look at what they can
do, and how they can be supported to become more
effective transfer organizations, we should have a mora-
torium on creating new institutions.
Promoting Innovation in the Cities
MYERS, FEILD, BESUDEN, GARDINER and BILLICK all
identified the basic barrier to technology transfer and innovation in the
cities as organizational. As MYERS put it:
The urban bureaucracies are culturall y deformed, as
compared to the rest of the society, which is swinging and
loose. The problem is how to change the culture of those
bureaucracies without destroying them, and how to do it
in a short enough period of time so that we don't let
ourselves be destroyed by their inaction. In order to do
that, we have to build for them some kind of innovative
ethic.
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He then presented his ideas for effecting change. Action is required at the
federal level, MYERS maintained, before much can be done on the local
scene:
The federal government has got to get its own innovative
house in order. By the federal government I mean every-
thing but the AEC, NASA, and the DOD. First they've got
to buy some innovative people from those agencies who
know how to develop and implement complex systems.
Then they should redesign their administrative machinery
to permit innovation at the local level; this is consistent
with the idea of the new federalism. Present uolicies
stultify innovation with too many rules, so that programs
are oversupervised and undermanaged.
3
One way of breaking the administrative logjam is to extend the
"proclaimer" system which is already in use for urban renewal projects.
Under this system, local planning agencies simply proclaim that they have
satisfied all administrative requirements; this is monitored by third parties
rather than by the granting agency such as HUD. This speeds action on
projects and encourages initiative, MYERS maintained.
Once these steps have been accomplished at the federal level, three
practices at the level of local government could be instituted to help build
the innovative ethic MYERS was advocating:
• Demonstration projects should be conducted not where the need
is greatest, but where the chances of visible, dramatic success are
high. TI-Lis should then be shown and explained to other
communities. To encourage rapid diffusion of successful
innovations, MYERS prescribed "more money for travel and less
for reports, more booze and less bull."
• The market mechanism should be introduced in those few
instances where it can be used. Examples are some direct con-
tracting for private-enterprise postal services (to create com-
petition for the Post Office), and paying for outputs rather than
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inputs, successes and accomplishments rather than investments.
An example is the Texarkana, Arkansas school experiment with
payment directly to an education corporation for demonstrated
improvement in childrens' reading ability. Here MYERS
commented, "Technology goes where the money flows", if success
is rewarded, innovation is more likely.
• Money should be used to "twist bureaucracies into shape." For
example, cities can't now afford to buy equipment which would
save them money. This, because of budgetary constraints, is
passively accepted as an excuse for not innovating. Thus it would
make sense to pay the city — through certificates of trust, leasing,
or other means — for any and all technology which a competent
operations research study shows will save the city money over a
period of time. Examples are garbage equipment, communications
systems, various types of vehicles. As MYERS noted, "City
department operations would have to be reoriented to use the new
technology. This will build an appetite for innovation. Then they
can buy some more technology and begin to innovate on their
own."
It became clear that effective technology transfer to public sector
groups such as local government will require systematic, persistent efforts
to change the environment or "opinion climate" within which city
government operates.
This is the way in which GARDINER summed up the need for
creating an opinion climate in the cities which would be receptive to
technology transfer:
One of our functions [as suppliers or purveyors of tech-
nology] has got to be to create the political, if you will,
backup for the urban manager, whatever his title is, to
justify his use of the information we can feed to him.
We've got to think of ways of packaging technology which
will help city executives justify the things that ought to be
done. If we can find ways of minimizing the political costs
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to them of getting something done, we're more likely to
get action.
Several approaches to creating an environment conduClVe to
transfer were suggested. One, advocated by GARDINER, is to create local
citizen groups with a special interest in particular aspects of urban
management, such as public safety or pollution control. These would be
more permanent and better informed groups than present "letterhead"
organizations or emergency committees which today are often the only
expression of public opinion of which local governments are aware. Better
measures of the quality of these services would give the citizenry their
justification for demanding change. Another parallel step would be to
create more "gatekeepers" in public organizations, the equivalent of the
research and development mediator in industry. The quality of the civil
service bureaucracy in local communities will have to be generally
upgraded through better incentive systems, an improved level of training,
and more awareness of management skills.
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CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CONFERENCE
In the closing session of the two-and-a-half day conference,
WELLES gave a summary of conference conclusions. These included an
appraisal of experience with technology transfer and recommendations for
research and action in the decade ahead. None of the participants took
serious exception to the following statements; they therefore serve to
express the sense of the meeting:
1. Further development of technology transfer systems should
focus more on people than on hardware. Some of the present media of
technology transfer were persistently, sometimes sharply, criticized at the
conference. Printed information was said to be less effective than transfer
of people with the required knowledge, face-to-face communication,
"show and tell" demonstrations and similar techniques. It was tacitly
agreed that delivery of printed information to potential users does not by
itself assure technology transfer. Significantly, the largest government
technology transfer program (at NASA) plans to make more use of these
additional techniques, particularly with user groups outside of industry
and on public sector problems.
2. Refining, packaging, and selling of technology should receive
more attention. The existing superabundance of information on new
technology is of uneven quality, "a mixture of junk and pearls." To find
the pearls takes more refinement, winnowing and adaptation by potential
users than has been generally admitted by many in the technology transfer
programs. To enhance the programmed flow of useful technology, existing
innovations must be much better selected and targeted to specific kinds of
users, and be packaged in ways which really meet their needs. Even then,
new broker groups may be needed between the sources of relevant
technology and potential users such as local government and other public
sector organizations.
3. Past attention to technology transfer has focused on supply
side; future attention should focus on demand side and on differences
among user groups. Much more emphasis should be given to understanding
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and improving the "demand" side of the supply-demand equation of
technology transfer. Within organizations, we know too little about what
blocks or helps the flow of useful technology. For all potential users, but
particularly in the public sector, ways must be developed to understand
and then strengthen forces which will motivate the user to discover and
adopt appropriate technologies, improving the environment for tech-
nology transfer.
4. Motivations for technology transfer need to be enhanced,
particularly in the public sector. Profit, and related motivations, dominate
the private sector and in most industries foster transfer and innovation.
Public sector motivations were identified as political achievement and
public service, neither of which are traditionally linked to using new
technology.
5. The value of selected technologies for solving societal
problems should be endorsed by high level leadership. The word
"selected" was defined to mean that criteria reflecting the public interest
need to be developed, to make better jjidgements about what kinds of
technology ought to be transferred, and to whom. These criteria should 	
t
take into account not only economic but also social values, and benefits as
well as costs. Creating all 	 and aroused public opinion, "mass
enlightenment," for wise application of technology to public sector needs
will depend upon high-level national support and activ° advocacy.
Specifically, the Office of Science and Technology, tale Congress, and
national leaders should direct attention to the role of technology in
helping to meet current crises in environmental pollution, urban manage-
ment, health, education, housing public safety, transportation and similar
areas.
6. The environment for technology transfer should be created or
modified through education and reward mechanisms. Though much can
still be done to improve the technology transfer process in the private
sector, the challenge for the 1970's will be to conquer the barriers to
diffusion, transfer and innovation in the public sector. Public sector
organizations and "interfacing" groups — local governments, educational
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systems, suppliers of equipment and services, the building industry, health
services — will have to be changed if the use of appropriate technologies is
to begin or to be increased to meet needs which have already reached
crisis proportions. These changes do not necessarily require new institu-
tions, but they will depend on a public which is educated to see the
opportunities (as well as the threats) that technology offers for better
public services. This can make enhanced technology transfer politically
attractive.
ti
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THE CONFERENCE AGENDA
First Session
"Prospective Changes in Technology Transfer
Messages and Media." KNOX
Second Session
"The User's Needs: What Industry Wants,"
Panel: BIEBER, MULLIS, LOEBNER, MERCURE
"The User's Needs: What Local Government Wants." BESUDEN
Third Session
"The Federal Government as Source and User."
Panel: PHILIPS, MOFFETT, BILLICK, GRATTON
Fourth Session
"Research Toward Rationalizing Technology Transfer."
Panel: ALLEN, MAHONEY, MURDOCK, SPENCER, GILMORE
Fifth Session
"Can Technology Transfer Systems Be Designed?"
Summary Session led by WELLES, with Panel on Transferring
Technology to the City GARDINER, MYERS, and FEILD
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WILLIAM E. BESUDEN is a former city manager who now is
Assistant Director of the International City Management Association in
Washington, D. C. Besuden is involved in the transfer of technology to
local government.
HERMAN BIEBER is a Senior Research Associate at Esso
Research and Engineering and active in several professional groups
concerned with the flow of scientific and technical information. He is
responsible for coordinating information and acting as the liaison for
corporate research within Esso.
IRWIN BILLICK is Deputy Director for Environmental Quality
Control in the Office of Research and Technology, Department of
Housing and Urban Development. He is involved in projects aimed at
introducing new public service technology into the urban environment.
ARTHUR BINKLEY is a member of the Tape Design Group in the
Denver facilities of Honeywell, Inc. He has been a technical writer in the
past and is interested in the transfer of technology through technical
publications.
JAMES P. BLACKLEDGE is Associate Director of the University
of Denver Research Institute. He is program director for a NASA grant
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project to study the role of universities in increasing their effectiveness as
technology transfer agents.
JOSEPH M. CARLSON is on the staff of the Technology Utiliza-
tion Division, Office of Technology Utilization, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. He is responsibl y for the NASA Regional Dissemi-
nation Centers and for program evaluation within TUD.
DEAN C. CODDINGTON is on the staff of the Industrial
Economics Division at the University of Denver Research Institute. He is
currently supervisor of the Project for the Analysis of Technology
Transfer, a NASA-sponsored project to look at the uses made of NASA-
generated technology and the technology transfer process.
JOHN FEILD is the Executive Director of the U. S. Conference of
Mayors, and is involved in several programs to foster innovation in the
cities.
JOHN A. GARDINER heads a new program concerned with
technology and innovation in local law enforcement as part of the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
JOHN S. GILMORE, director of the conference, is a Senior
Research Economist in the Industrial Economics Division of the
University of Denver Research Institute. He has been involved in research
on the processes and problems in the diffusion, purposive transfer, and
utilization of new technologies in both the private and public sectors.
JOSEPH G. GRATTON is Assistant Director of the Technical
Information Division of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission. Gratton's
interest in technology transfer is in trying to release AEC-developed
technology both within the AEC and to industry.
CHARLES H. HEWITT is Associate Research Director at the
Marathon Oil Company, Denver Research Center. He is involved in
generating advanced technology related to the oil industry, integrating
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that technology with information from outside sources, and implementing
the use of new technology in the operations of Marathon Oil Company.
S. A. JOHNSON, JR., is Director of the L;::versity of Denver
Research Institute. A member of the U. S. Department of Commerce
Technical Advisory Board panel on State and Local Government Response
to Technological Opportunities and Problems, he is involved in several
efforts to move technology to new applications.
WILLIAM KNOX, formerly at Esso Research and Engineering and
later a member of the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive
Office of the President, is now a Vice President of McGraw-Hill, inc., and
President of the Information Industry Association.
EGON LOEBNER is on the senior staff of the Corporate Research
Division c` Hewlett-Packard Company, and also teaches at Stanford
University. He is involved in transferring solid state science and tech-
nology into electronic communication, instrumentation, and data
processing applications.
JAMES E. MAHONEY conducts studies of technology transfer
within the Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology, George
Washington University. He was formerly Chief of the Technology
Dissemination Branch, Technology Utilization Division, NASA Head-
quarters. He is interested in the transfer of technology to various societal
problem areas.
MORTON V. MALIN is Vice President for Corporate Planning and
International Relati-:-s at the Institute for Scientific Information in
Philadelphia. His m:.jc)r concern with technology transfer is in the alerting
of users to new technology.
R. C. MERCURE is President of Ball Brothers Research Corpora-
tion in Boulder, Colorado. Ball Brothers has assisted in several studies
dealing in technology transfer, and is currently involved in an Operation
Breakthrough proposal.
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WILLIAM E. MOFFETT is now a consultant on governmental
affairs to the Gulf Oil Corporation. At the time of the conference he was
on the staff of the Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International
Development.
CHARLES W. MULLIS is Director of Technical Coordination,
Corporate Research, for the Owens-Illinois Corporation in Toledo, Ohio.
From 1964-68 he was Associate Director of ARAC, a NASA Regional
Dissemination Center.
JOHN W. MURDOCK is Assistant Manager of the Department of
Economic and Information Research at Battelle Memorial Institute in
Columbus, Ohio. He has overall responsibility for information research at
Battelle's Colu, ►:bus Laboratories.
SUMNER MYERS, an industrial engineer who has studied tech-
nology transfer and innovation in private industry, is now Director of
T e c h n o- Urban Studies at the Institute of Public Administration,
Washington, D. C. He specializes in problems of planning, recreation,
transportation, and technological innovation.
RONALD PHILIPS directs the Technology Utilization Division,
Office of Technology Utilization, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the most extensive program for expediting technology
transfer in the federal government.
CHARLTON R. PRICE lectures on organizational behavior at the
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and is a consultant to
Stanford Research Institute.
EDWARD S. SAFFORD is President of the Denver Division of
Cahners Publishing Company. In that capacity, he is exploring all channels
of communication to provide "business infonnation" in the most usable
forms.
PETER L. SHOUP, a consultant and writer on the design and
development of social systems, was formerly assistant to the president of
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Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City, and director of M RI's
Washington office.
DANIEL L. SPENCER, an economist, is Chairman of the
Department of Economics, Howard University. He has been interested in
the transfer of military skills to the civilian sec tor and comparative studies
of technological development.
RUSSELL B. VLAANDEREN directs research and development
activities in the Colorado State Department of Education. He is involved
in the diffusion of educational innovations.
JOHN WELLES heads the Industrial Economics Division of the
University of Denver Research Institute. He supervised the pioneering
Commercial Applications of MissilelSpace Technology study (1961-63)
and has overseen the subsequent DRI research in technology transfer.
HAROLD WOOSTER is Director of Information Sciences, Air
Force Office of Scientific Research. Wooster is concerned with getting
AFOSR publications to the "right people at the right time."
45
